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Purpose – Drought related climate risk and access to credit are among the major risks to 
agricultural productivity for smallholder farmers in Kenya. Farmers are usually credit 
constrained either due to involuntary quantity rationing or voluntary risk rationing. By 
exploiting randomized distribution of weather risk-contingent credit (RCC) and traditional 
credit, we estimate the causal effect of bundling weather index insurance to credit on uptake of 
agricultural credits among rural smallholders in Eastern Kenya. Further, we assess farmers’ 
credit rationing, its determinants and effects on credit uptake. 
Design/methodology/approach – The study design was a Randomized Controlled Trial (RCT) 
conducted in Machakos County, Kenya. 1170 sample households were randomly assigned to 
one of three research groups: 351 farmers assigned to receive traditional credit; 351 farmers 
assigned to receive RCC; 117 farmers assigned to receive RCC with subsidies on insurance 
premium; and 351 farmers assigned to receive no credit. This paper is based on baseline 
household survey data and the first phase of loan implementation data. 
Findings – We find that 48% of the households were price-rationed, 41% were risk-rationed 
and 11% were quantity-rationed. The average credit uptake rate was 33% with the uptake of 
bundled credit being significantly higher than that of traditional credit. Risk rationing seems to 
influence the credit uptake negatively whereas premium subsidies do not have any significant 
association with credit uptake.  Among the socio-economic variables, training attendance, crop 
production being the main household head occupation, expenditure on food, maize labour 
requirement, hired labour, livestock revenue and access to credit are found to influence the 
credit uptake positively whereas the expenditure on non-food items is negatively related with 
credit uptake.   
Research limitations/ implications – Our findings provide important insights on the factors 
of credit demand. Empirical results suggest that risk rationing is pervasive and discourages 
farmers to take up credit. Our results also imply that credit demand is inelastic in our study 
sample although relatively small sample size for RCC premium subsidy groups may be a 
limiting factor of our estimation.  
Originality/value – By implementing a multi-arm RCT we estimate the factors affecting the 
uptake of agricultural credits along with eliciting credit rationing among rural smallholders in 
Eastern Kenya.  
Keywords: Risk-contingent credit, Index insurance, Credit rationing, Credit uptake, Bundled 
insurance  
Paper type: Research paper 
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Uptake of Insurance-Embedded Credit in Presence of Credit Rationing: Evidence from 
a Randomized Controlled Trial in Kenya 
1.0 Introduction 
Rural households from low income countries have listed unfavourable weather conditions as 
one of the most important risks affecting productivity and household resilience (Cole., 2012). 
For instance, analysis of household risks from Malawi by Giné & Yang (2009),  from Ethiopia 
by Dercon and Christiaensen (2011) and from India by Cole et al. (2013) confirm that rainfall 
variability and shocks are the largest source of risk to agricultural productivity and 
consumption. Moreover, weather risks and climate shocks are critically important constraints 
to wealth accumulation, particularly for those in rural areas who are either engaged in 
agricultural activities or have their livelihoods tied to the well-being of the farming sector 
(Barrett et al., 2007). Consequently, many farmers from developing countries have low 
capacity to adapt to weather related risks. Covariate impacts can also have a rippling effect 
throughout the rural and agricultural economies affecting farm workers, input suppliers, 
entrepreneurs and workers in agribusiness, and providers of non-tradable goods and services 
in the rural non-farm economy (Carter et al. 2014). Governments and development agencies 
are not spared as they face sudden demands for relief, reconstruction, and recovery (Carter et 
al., 2014; Chantarat et al., 2007; Chantarat et al., 2008; Cummins & Mahul, 2009).    
To help farmers cope with the impacts of weather shocks, several interventions have 
been tried. Most of them have been developed under the Climate Smart Agriculture (CSA) 
umbrella with adaptive capacity, sustainable intensification and Green House Gases (GHGs) 
mitigation as the main goals (Branca 2012). They range from conservation agriculture (CA), 
to stress tolerant crop varieties, pests and diseases management methods, promotion of 
adaptable alternative crops and animals, capacity building and gender mainstreaming as well 
as innovative ways of timely sharing the right information with farmers, mostly through mobile 
phones. Such interventions have been developed and promoted mostly by governments and the 
donor community and are mostly targeted towards promoting new and efficient technologies. 
However, the impacts of weather shocks on agriculture are huge and covariate in nature, and 
at times catastrophic. As such, the public sector cannot solve them on their own. There is need 
for market-based interventions to (1) help the farmers afford and adopt such technologies 
and/or practices, and (2) protect them against weather and climate risks. To provide farmers 
with risk protection, different insurance contracts have been tried where weather index 
insurance has been developed to particularly provide hedging against weather shocks. Carter 
et al. (2014) define Index-Based Insurance (IBI) as a major institutional innovation that could 
revolutionize access to insurance for millions of smallholder farmers. Similar  agricultural 
insurance products  have been offered to farmers for quite some time now especially in the 
developed and industrialized countries although under high levels of public subsidies ( Turvey 
2001; Glauber 2004; Carter et al. 2014) (Smith and Watts, 2009).. For the last two decades, 
index insurance products have been introduced in several low-income countries at individual 
(micro) and/or institutional (meso) levels but mostly as pilot and/or experimental projects 
(Carter et al., 2014).   
The impact of weather and climate risks on smallholder farming is further compounded 
by the fact that farmers lack capital and have limited to no access to credit, especially from 
formal credit institutions. This undermines their capacity to afford/adopt high yielding 
technologies. Access to credit has, however, been found to be positively correlated to 
productivity and resilience among the rural farming households, who are mostly small scale 
farmers (Muhamma & Jan, 2011).  Lack of credit constrains optimal use of inputs and limits 
marketing opportunities which eventually lead to disinvestment and poverty traps (Barrett et 
al., 2007; Chantarat et al., 2017; Shee & Turvey, 2012; Shee et al., 2015).   
In theory, credit is an important resource that allows farmers to expand their operations 
or adopt new technologies to achieve higher productivity and profitability (Dzadze at al. 2012). 
In practice, the associated financial and liquidity risks that come with credit use constrains its 
adoption. Risks can not only impact supply-side credit rationing, but also demand side risk-
rationing (Boucher et al., 2008; Verteramo-Chiu et al., 2014). In principal, banks use restrictive 
lending policies to avoid loss on investments. Because of risk of default, they are hesitant to 
not only lend but also increase interest rates on those they deem as risky borrowers. They either 
give less credit than demanded or reject them altogether (Chodechai, 2004; Stiglitz & Weiss, 
1981). This leads to credit/quantity rationing, a non-temporary disequilibrium condition with 
excess demand for credit than the banks are willing to supply. On the other hand, the banks 
may require relatively high collateral to cover the risks of the credit to be advanced. This may 
in return expose farmers to unacceptable risk of collateral loss and hence they voluntarily 
excuse themselves from the credit markets and hence they are risk rationed  (Boucher et al., 
2008; Boucher et al., 2009). 
Part of the problem can be resolved with agricultural insurance. In theory, index-based 
insurance provides farmers with risk cover and removes the fear of investing in new 
technologies while credit, on the other hand, would enable them to access/afford those 
technologies. On its own, insurance may be ineffective since most of the time farmers are 
liquidity constrained to even afford the premiums that are usually required to be paid upfront 
(Chantarat et al., 2017) and (Smith and Watts, 2009). Combining insurance with credit is hence 
crucial to achieve the dual advantage of risk cover and adoption of technologies. Carter et al. 
(2011) showed that uptake of improved technology will be low if efforts to link credit and 
insurance are not made.  However, financing in agriculture in low income countries is 
underdeveloped as evidenced by low to zero portfolios of agricultural loans by financial 
institutions. For instance, in Kenya, even after the government made efforts to focus on 
agriculture to eradicate poverty and increase food security, Kenyan banks still hold less than 
5% of agricultural loans in their portfolios (Maloba & Alhassan, 2019). 
  To borrowers, business risks increase financial risks, and to lenders financial risks 
increase business risks. This natural incompatibility is difficult to resolve but bundling 
insurance with credit can bridge the credit access gap between the financial institutions and 
rural smallholder farmers. Bundled, or risk-contingent credit are designed to shift risk from 
both the farmer and the financial institution to the insurance markets1.  
Substantial effort has been made towards integrating insurance and credit for 
smallholder farmers albeit at theoretical and experimental level. For instance, Giné and Yang 
(2009) conducted a randomized field evaluation of traditional and rainfall index insured credits 
in Malawi and found higher uptake of traditional credit than the insured credit. Karlan et al. 
(2011) attempted to compare traditional credit with a price contingent credit in Ghana to assess 
if whether risks have any effect on investment. It was however impossible to evaluate this since 
uptake for both credit types was high and homogenous. They in the end recommended further 
research but with other risks, such as rainfall variability, with larger sample sizes, training and 
longer-term commitments to maintain meaningful presence in a market. Carter et al. (2011) 
theoretically studied the impacts of insurance-linked credit on financial market deepening and 
small farm productivity and concluded that for index insurance to work, it must be contractually 
interlinked with credit needed to capitalize the adoption of new improved technologies. Shee 
and Turvey (2012) developed a risk contingent credit as an alternative to traditional agricultural 
credit and working with simulated field data from pulse farmers in India, concluded that it 
provided downside risk protection against commodity price fluctuations.  
This paper is part of a wider study dubbed Satellite Technologies, Innovative and Smart 
Financing for Food Security (SATISFy) implemented by IFPRI, NRI, Equity Bank, APA 
 
1 Although our approach is at the micro-level, it is consistent with previous studies which recommend moving 
IBI from considering specific households to various local level risk aggregators (organisations that do business 
with farmers) may be more appropriate (Barnett & Mahul, 2007; Farrin & Miranda, 2015; Glauber, 2004; Pelka, 
Musshoff, & Weber, 2014; von Negenborn, Weber, & Musshoff, 2017). They include lenders such as banks, 
MFIs as well as farmer associations.  
Insurance and other partners. It aimed at developing a weather index-insurance linked credit 
and to evaluate its impacts on promoting resilience and food security for smallholder farmers.  
Related work has been done with several theoretical prepositions but limited empirical research 
(Jensen and Barrett, 2017).  For instance, Shee & Turvey (2012) proposed a Risk Contingent 
Credit (RCC) model which implies a credit instrument bundled with index insurance, 
transferring part or all of the borrower’s liability to the lender or insurer if triggered. Giné and 
Yang (2009) investigated adoption of an operating loan in Malawi where the payoff was 
determined by rainfall, and Shee and Turvey (2012) proposed downside risk protection for the 
pulse farmers in India. A recent review by Marr et al. (2016) asserts that only limited empirical 
research has been conducted on the impact of bundled products such as combination of 
insurance and credit. They concluded that the extent to which credit suppliers would react to 
the insured status of farmers is unknown as well as the farmers’ preferences when it comes to 
a mix of financial products. This study aims at making significant contribution in investigating 
the determinants of uptake of such a bundled financial product. This paper in particular aims 
to (1) establish the credit rationing and the drivers of rationing among the rural smallholder 
households, (2) establish the effect of credit rationing on uptake, (3) assess the uptake of both 
the traditional credit and RCC and (4) measure the treatment (RCC) effect on loan uptake as 
well as establish other drivers of traditional credit and RCC uptake. 
The remainder of this paper is as follows. In section 2, we present the RCT study design, 
sampling procedures, data collection, and respondents’ descriptive statistics. In section 3, we 
describe the empirical methodology to identify the determinants of uptake of insurance-
embedded credit and the determinants of credit rationing. Finally, in section 4, we present and 
discuss the estimation results, followed by concluding comments. 
 
2.0 Materials and methods 
2.1 Structure of randomized control trial  
The study was a Randomized Controlled Trial (RCT) conducted in Machakos County, Kenya. 
This paper is based on baseline household survey data and the first phase of implementation 
which took place from April 2017 to June 2018. Five sub-counties were selected in consultation 
with Equity Bank and provincial administration officials. Thirteen locations, which serve as 
the clusters for this project, were then selected from the five Sub-counties. Sub counties and 
locations/cluster selection was purposive considering Equity Bank’s coverage and capacity to 
deliver the proposed products. Later, at the onset of the baseline survey, six villages per location 
were randomly selected. This was done from villages sampling frame comprising of lists of 
villages per location which were provided by the Chiefs, the local administrators in charge of 
locations. Thereafter, the sub-chiefs and village elders from the selected villages provided the 
research team with household sampling frames including the names of all households under 
their jurisdiction. Fifteen households per village were randomly selected from the sampling 
frame giving us 90 households per location and 1170 in total. The baseline survey was 
implemented from May 16 to June 2, 2017. This was conducted by a team of 30 trained 
enumerators and supervisors using a pretested questionnaire. Data collection was done 
electronically using a questionnaire programmed into Tablets using CSPro. 
The RCT protocol is illustrated in Figure 1. Following the baseline survey, selected 
farmers were invited to training events which involved games and roll-playing to explain RCC, 
costs and benefits, payment structures and limitations. The training events were conducted at 
the location/cluster level (90 households) and targeted either the household head or spouse.  It 
was during this training that households were randomly assigned to the experimental groups 
by drawing a chip from an urn (Figure 2) 2. Treatment included one group to be offered 
traditional credit (N=351) and a second that would be offered RCC (N=351). A third group, 
used as a control, received no credit offer (N=351).  To gather some insights into the demand 
elasticity of RCC, a subset of 117 RCC members were offered subsidies of 25%, 50% and 75% 
of the effective costs of insurance premiums. The training events and lotteries were conducted 
between September 19th - 29th 2017. 
 
2 This was done as public lotteries whereby each participant blindly drew a chip once from the urn and the 
outcome was announced publicly and entered against his/her name in the households’ lists. Those who were not 
in the meeting were picked for by the chiefs, sub-chiefs, village elders or someone who knew them. There were 
27 chips written Control, 27 written Normal credit, 27 written RCC, and 3 chips of each subsidy categories 
(25%, 50% and 75% subsidy on premium). This adds up to 90 chips which were just enough for the selected 


























Figure 2: The printed chips used during the random assignment lotteries 
2.2 Weather index insurance design 
The insurance linked to credit in this RCT was based on Climate Hazards Group InfraRed 
Precipitation with Station data (CHIRPS) rainfall measures for the traditional long rain season 
in Machakos County from October 15th to January 15th. Detailed procedures are reported in 
Shee et al (2019). In brief, historical dekadal (10-daily) rainfall data from 1981 to present were 
collected for each of the 11 sub-counties in Machakos County. Cumulative rainfall measures 
were fit to a PERT distribution, with a cumulative rainfall ‘trigger’ set at the 20th percentile for 
each sub-county. Correlated Monte Carlo simulation was used to compute actuarial rates 
assuming Ksh 300 tick value for every millimetre of rainfall below the trigger. The tick value 
was determined by the amount required to pay off the loan principal in a worst-case scenario. 
Although the trigger value and probability distributions differed by sub-county, the actual 
premiums averaged about 12% across districts. With a 25% loading factor imposed by the 
insurer, the yield as a percentage of the loan amount was set at 15% for each sub-county, even 
though each of them had a distinct trigger against which indemnities were to be calculated. 
 
2.3 The lending processes 
The RCT provided ‘access’ to credit for 819 farmers but providing access did not necessarily 
mean the farmer would accept the offer and use the credit. Since many farmers had no prior 
interaction with the local lender, Treatment farmers were invited to mandatory meetings where 
they received further training on the bank’s loan processes and, where necessary, opened a 
bank account. This was a bank-led process with the bank applying conventional rules in due 
diligence to determine credit worthiness.  
To ensure that credit was to be used only in production processes the loan amount was 
not advanced in cash. Instead, farmers were provided vouchers which they used to collect 
inputs from local Agrovet supply shops within their communities. The Agrovets had been 
selected earlier in consultation with the farmers.  
The maximum loan amount was set at Ksh 10,000, or $100, which was deemed 
sufficient to provide improved inputs for maize production for one acre for one season. For the 
RCC group, the Ksh 1,400 insurance premium (14%) was added to the base loan3.  The 
premium was automatically transferred to the local insurance firm4. The interest rate applied 
to the loan balance was 14%/year5.  
 
2.4 Credit rationing and risk rationing 
We adapted and modified the direct elicitation method proposed by Boucher et al., (2009) and 
applied by Verteramo-Chiu et al., (2014) to capture households’ rationing status and the 
process is illustrated by Shee et al (2018). We asked the respondents a set of credit-related 
questions and used the responses to rate and group them into three groups namely: (1) 
unconstrained also called price rationed consisting of farmers who either were being 
 
3 The original design followed that proposed in Shee and Turvey (2012) who proposed that the insurance 
premium be added to the interest rate and prorated over the life of the loan (approximately 9 months). However, 
in this instance the insurer demanded that the premium be paid up-front. This increased the total cost of RCC by 
the accumulation of compound interest on the insurance premium over the life of the loan. 
4 Loan amounts and premiums were adjusted for farmers receiving an insurance ‘subsidy’. The subsidy amount 
was transferred directly from project funds to the insurer.  
5 The interest rate was the base interest rate applied to all loans at the time. Since RCC was based on the 
accumulation of rainfall throughout the ‘long-rain’ season (October 15th to January 15th) there were concerns by 
the lender that failure of rains did not constitute the entirety of credit risks faced by the bank. Consequently, it 
was required that project funds be used to provide a 100% guarantee of all loans originated. These funds had to 
be deposited on account before any loans (traditional or RCC) could be made.  
approached by banks to take credit, would normally receive full credit they applied for or did 
not have a demand for credit since they are not capital constrained, (2) quantity rationed 
implying a supply-side rationing where farmers either get less credit than their demand or they 
are denied credit altogether and (3) risk rationed comprising of farmers who excuse 
themselves from the credit markets due to fear of losing collateral or other implications of 
defaulting on loan repayment. Out of the total sample, 48% were unconstrained, 11% were 
quantity rationed and 41% were risk rationed. As illustrated in Figure 3, random assignment 




              Figure 3: Credit rationing groups disaggregated into control and treatment categories 
 
2.5 Households’ socio-economic characteristics 
Socio-economic characteristics of the sample are provided in Table 1.  Consistent with 
randomized treatments, we find that traditional credit and RCC households were similar on all 
the baseline characteristics as shown by p-values columns of Table 1.  48% of the households 
were credit unconstrained, 11% were quantity rationed and 41% were risk rationed. 71% of the 
sampled households were represented in the initial training that was offered to explain the 
products as well as offer some financial literacy and tips on good maize agronomic practices. 
66% of the household heads were practicing crop production as their main occupation while 
only 2% were into livestock production as main their occupation. 79% of the household heads 
were male with an average age of 56 years and 8.6 years of formal education, which implies 
they had cleared at least primary school education. The average household size was 6 (5.8) 
persons, which is typical of rural households in Kenya (Bongaarts & Casterline, 2013). 
Dependency ratio was 80% implying that only 20% of the household members were of the 
working age, defined as anyone above 14 years old and below 65 years old. On average, they 
were spending Ksh 2,280 (USD 22.80) weekly on food, Ksh 4,560 (USD 45.60) monthly on 
other non-food but frequent items such as fuel, transport, etc, and Ksh 89,920 (USD 89.92) 
annually on other non-food low frequency items such as clothes, fees, medication, etc. They 
had access to 4 acres of land whereby most of it (3.83 acres) was own land, 0.14 acres were 
rented in and 0.03 was borrowed land. Generally, renting and borrowing in land is not a very 
common practice in the research areas. Half of this land was under maize. They had an annual 
maize production of 833kg per household. This translates to roughly 9 bags of 90kg each, 
which is the most common item used for storage and measuring cereals in Kenya. Maize took 
most of the labour in man-days with an average of 190-man days per year compared to beans 
which took 28 days only. 35% of the total farm labour was hired labour with the rest coming 
from family and exchange labour.  
Respondents report that they spent roughly Ksh 4,000 (USD 40) annually on fertilizer. 
All animals/livestock in the household summed up to roughly 7 tropical livestock unit (TLU)6, 
which was valued at Ksh 86,190 (USD 861.90) and earned the households Ksh 13,540 (USD 
135.40) annually. Households were represented in at least two social groups within the 
community. Access to extension in this area is very low with an average score of 1.12 out of 
possible 8. On a subjective welfare scale of 1 (very bad) to 5 (very good), the households scored 
an average of 2.78 ~3 which puts them at the middle of the scale. This means that, on average, 
respondents viewed their economic condition as being neither good nor bad in the local context. 
To determine risk attitudes, we included in the baseline survey a simple experimental 
game following Binswanger (1980). First, respondents were rewarded with Ksh 300 
(equivalent to average daily wage for the region) for their time. They were then asked if they 
wanted to risk their reward by participating in a risk game with potentially higher or lower 
returns, depending on the outcome of tossing a coin once.  99% agreed to participate in the risk 
 
6 To estimate TLU ownership per household, we mostly relied on Chilonda & Otte (2006) livestock units 
conversion table.  The TLU column was calculated as a product of the number of animals owned by the 
households per species and its respective exchange ratio/coefficient in the TLU conversion table. Some species 
in the data collected were however not present in Chilonda & Otte's (2006) table. In such cases, and since TLU 
conversions are based on animals’ weight, we used the coefficients of the animals in the table whose weight is 
closest to them. 
game. Those willing to take risk were then provided with five coin-tossing options to identify 
where a household stands from being extremely risk-averse to preferring risk or being neutral. 
Following Binswanger's (1980) risk aversion classification, the average constant relative risk 
aversion score was 0.4 which indicate that on average, the households were moderately risk-
averse.  
 
Table 1: Comparing baseline means between control and treatment categories 



















value   
 
Unconstrained 0.47 0.48 0.679  0.48 0.49 0.904  0.48 
 (0.50) (0.50)   (0.50) (0.50)   (0.50) 
Quantity rationed 0.10 0.11 0.573  0.11 0.11 0.765  0.11 
 (0.30) (0.31)   (0.31) (0.32)   (0.31) 
Risk rationed 0.43 0.41 0.447  0.41 0.4 0.755  0.41 
 (0.50) (0.49)   (0.49) (0.49)   (0.49) 
Attended initial training and 
lotteries 
0.75 0.69 0.026  0.67 0.72 0.166  0.71 
(0.43) (0.46)   (0.47) (0.45)   (0.45) 
Crop production is household head 
main occupation 
0.7 0.64 0.028  0.64 0.64 0.983  0.66 
(0.46) (0.48)   (0.48) (0.48)   (0.47) 
Livestock rearing is household head 
main occupation 
0.01 0.02 0.277  0.03 0.02 0.299  0.02 
(0.12) (0.15)   (0.16) (0.13)   (0.14) 
Household head education level 8.63 8.62 0.969  8.6 8.66 0.814  8.63 
 (4.04) (3.74)   (3.78) (3.70)   (3.83) 
Male household head 0.77 0.79 0.57  0.79 0.79 0.766  0.79 
 (0.42) (0.41)   (0.41) (0.40)   (0.41) 
Age of household head 56.54 56.05 0.562  56.56 55.36 0.192  56.19 
 (13.71) (12.99)   (12.67) (13.39)   (13.21) 
Household size 5.79 5.74 0.752  5.69 5.81 0.491  5.76 
 (2.41) (2.32)   (2.26) (2.40)   (2.35) 
Dependency ratio  87.36 76.57 0.045  76.72 76.37 0.946  79.84 
 (87.76) (73.43)   (76.82) (68.71)   (78.18) 
Household dietary diversification 
index 
10.36 10.32 0.58  10.35 10.28 0.313  10.33 
(0.94) (0.98)   (0.96) (1.01)   (0.97) 
Weekly expenditure on food (Ksh 
"000") 
2.26 2.29 0.723  2.28 2.3 0.852  2.28 
(1.19) (1.15)   (1.12) (1.19)   (1.16) 
Expenditure on non-food items last 
30 days (Ksh "000") 
4.89 4.41 0.168  4.33 4.53 0.587  4.56 
(5.38) (5.44)   (6.10) (4.42)   (5.42) 
Expenditure on non-food items last 
12 months (Ksh "000")  
82.81 92.97 0.257  88.94 98.34 0.489  89.92 
(108.90) (195.26)   (204.21) (182.80)   (173.93) 
Total land accessed (acre) 3.71 4.13 0.27  4.34 3.85 0.393  4 
 (4.19) (8.91)   (11.12) (4.53)   (7.80) 
Land owned by household (acre) 3.56 3.95 0.306  4.15 3.69 0.421  3.83 
 (4.16) (8.90)   (11.10) (4.53)   (7.79) 
Land rented in (acre) 0.13 0.14 0.708  0.14 0.14 0.892  0.14 
 (0.54) (0.58)   (0.64) (0.48)   (0.57) 
Borrowed in land (acre) 0.02 0.04 0.34  0.05 0.02 0.218  0.03 
 (0.20) (0.41)   (0.53) (0.17)   (0.36) 
Per capita land ownership (acre) 0.76 0.88 0.364  0.97 0.77 0.384  0.85 
 (0.93) (3.68)   (4.76) (1.17)   (3.12) 
Land under seasonal crop (acre) 0.96 1.46 0.081  1.73 1.1 0.182  1.31 
 (2.12) (7.62)   (9.88) (2.30)   (6.49) 
Area under maize (acre) 2.00 2.04 0.730  2.025 2.055 0.817  2.025 
 (1.84) (2.03)   (2.20) (1.77)   (1.97) 
Annual maize production (kg) 832.27 833.06 0.991  792.96 886.52 0.281  832.82 
 (957) (1,241)   (1,278) (1,189)   (1,163) 
Annual maize labour (man day) 185.5 192.31 0.516  187.37 198.89 0.414  190.27 
 (150.27) (192.73)   (170.91) (218.56)   (181.01) 
Annual beans labour (man days) 27.5 27.86 0.875  26.2 30.08 0.244  27.75 
 (31.75) (43.87)   (32.21) (55.72)   (40.60) 
Percent of hired labour 33.02 36.15 0.155  35.2 37.4 0.377  35.21 
 (34.07) (34.98)   (34.22) (35.99)   (34.73) 
Annual total expenditure on 
fertilizer (Ksh "000") 
4.10 3.93 0.68  3.84 4.06 0.58  3.98 
(6.30) (5.67)   (5.31) (6.12)   (5.86) 
Tropical livestock unit 8.16 6.06 0.63  5.31 7.06 0.634  6.69 
 (75.40) (48.43)   (36.36) (60.95)   (57.83) 
Value of animals in household 78.9 89.31 0.101  87.48 91.74 0.641  86.19 
 (80.62) (133.43)   (145.56) (115.44)   (120.11) 
Total revenue from animals 8.85 15.55 0.017  13.55 18.21 0.404  13.54 
 (23.81) (71.26)   (40.75) (98.19)   (61.10) 
Social groups/network index 2.32 2.32 1.000  2.31 2.33 0.707  2.32 
 (1.02) (0.93)   (0.92) (0.95)   (0.96) 
Extension services access index 1.24 1.07 0.187  1.11 1.01 0.496  1.12 
 (2.10) (2.03)   (2.03) (2.03)   (2.05) 
Subjective economic welfare 2.82 2.78 0.353  2.76 2.8 0.44  2.79 
Household went a whole day 
without food 
(0.62) (0.66)   (0.68) (0.63)   (0.65) 
0.05 0.04 0.625  0.05 0.02 0.114  0.04 
(0.37) (0.29)   (0.34) (0.21)   (0.32) 
Constant Relative Risk Aversion 
(CRRA) score 
  
0.4 0.4 0.904  0.41 0.4 0.765  0.4 






3.0 Empirical framework  
Since the assignment of treatments was randomized, the empirical strategy to establish the 
drivers of credit uptake avoids problems of endogeneity and justifies a distributional 
assumption of normality (Angrist & Pischke, 2008; Cameron & Trivedi, 2010; Cole et al., 
2013; Giné & Yang, 2009; Karlan et al., 2011; Soderbom et al., 2015). Consequently, we 
investigate credit uptake with the binomial Probit model. 
We first estimate a univariate Probit model to measure the treatment (RCC) effect on 
the uptake (uptake = 1, otherwise = 0), using treatment dummies as predictor variables. Because 
of the randomization process these treatment variables are the only source of uncommon 
exogenous variation and are thus valid instruments (Angrist & Pischke, 2008; Soderbom et al., 
2015).  
The Probit model follows Soderbom et al., (2015): 
 
(1)             Pr(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 1 |𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖) =  Φ(𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖)  
 
Where 𝑦𝑦 is loan uptake which takes a value of 1 if a household accepted the credit offer and 0 
otherwise; 𝑇𝑇 is a factor variable representing treatment dummies which takes a value of 1 if a 
household ‘i’ was either in RCC or RCC plus subsidies and 0 if in traditional credit; and 𝛽𝛽 is 
the unknow treatment effect which we seek to estimate. The symbol Φ identifies a Probit 
estimator stochastic error term (𝜀𝜀) that is assumed to be normally distributed. A similar model 
was applied by (Cole et al., 2013) and Karlan et al. (2011) in their investigations into the 
determinants of uptake of credit bundled with index insurance policies.  
Second, we likewise estimate a similar univariate Probit model to establish the effect 
of credit rationing on uptake: 
 
(2)       Pr(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 1 |𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖) =  Φ(𝛽𝛽𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖)  
 
In this model, 𝑅𝑅 is a factor variable that takes the value of 1 if a household ‘i’ is either quantity 
or risk rationed and 0 if unconstrained. 𝛽𝛽 is the unknown effect of rationing on the uptake that 
we seek to establish. 
 Third, to determine the drivers of uptake, we extend the models by relaxing restrictions 
on individual household characteristics and estimate the multivariate binomial Probit model: 
 
(3)          Pr(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 1 |Τ𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) =  Φ(𝛽𝛽1Τ𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽3𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖 + ⋯+ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖  +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖)  
 
where 𝑥𝑥 is a vector of household and farm characteristics (1,2, …, k) added to the model to 
examine the drivers of uptake and  𝛽𝛽1,𝛽𝛽2,𝛽𝛽3, …𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘  are their estimated coefficients. 
 Finally, to determine the determinants of credit rationing, we estimate a multinomial 
Probit model of the form: 
 
(4)          Pr(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝑗𝑗|𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) =  Φ(𝛽𝛽1𝑗𝑗𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 + ⋯+  𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖)                   
 
Where 𝑦𝑦 represents our categorical outcome variable with j categories, i.e. price, quantity and 
risk rationed, 𝑥𝑥 is a k element vector of the determinants of rationing included in the estimation, 
and Φ indicates the multinomial normal distribution assumption of the error term and hence a 
multinomial Probit model.  
 
4.0 Results and discussions 
4.1 Credit Uptake  
Based on the conventional wisdom about linked or bundled credit, our results are quite 
surprising. Overall, 819 farmers were offered credit, either traditional or RCC. Despite a 
perception of heightened demand for credit, only 33% (267) accepted the credit offer. Two 
factors likely played a significant role in their decisions. The first was that the loans were 
restricted to agricultural practices and could not be used for any other purpose. The second 
factor could be a week or two delay in loan distribution which may have discouraged some 
farmers from taking a loan.   
The larger surprise was the determination that the difference in loan uptake was not 
substantially different among the treatments with 30% uptake among the traditional credit 
farmers and an average of 32% among the RCC categories (RCC with and without subsidies). 
Among the RCC farmers, those offered insured credit with a 25% subsidy on premium had the 
highest uptake at 37% followed by RCC without any subsidy and with 50% subsidy which tied 
at 35%. The lowest uptake was with RCC combined with 75% subsidy at barely a quarter 
(23%). These results suggest that credit demand is more inelastic than we thought. An 
overriding consideration is that the majority of participants had never received a formal loan 
before and so there was significant pent-up demand for credit of any type. In other words, the 
shadow price of the liquidity constraints facing these farmers was sufficiently higher than the 
cost of credit even with the additional charge of RCC, which corroborates some existing 
literature such as Barry et al (1981). 
Further, we compare uptake among the credit rationing groups. The unconstrained and 
quantity rationed farmers had markedly higher uptake than risk rationed farmers, and this was 
significant at 5%. The unconstrained and quantity rationed farmers' uptake tied at 35% while 
risk rationed uptake was at 29%. (Fig 4) 
 
 
                     Figure 4: Uptake descriptive - by treatment categories and rationing group 
 
4.2 Effect of treatment on the uptake 
To estimate the effect of RCC on up-take, we estimated binary univariate and multivariate 
Probit models with uptake = 1 and declined credit = 0 on the left hand and treatment dummies 
on the right. Traditional credit was considered as the base category. When we ran a univariate 
model, uptake of all RCC credit types was not significantly different from traditional credit. 
However, with a multivariate model, which controls for endogeneity and hence more precise, 
we find a positive and significant effect of RCC without subsidy on uptake. This implies that 
holding all other factors constant, farmers offered RCC without subsidy were more likely to 
take the credit than farmers offered traditional credit. This has a marginal effect of 0.068 
indicating that RCC without subsidy increased uptake by roughly 7%. Uptake of RCC 
combined with different levels of subsidies on premium was not significantly different from 
the uptake of traditional credit as shown in Table 2. We had also tried to compare uptake of 
RCC with and without subsidies and still the difference was not statistically significant. It is 
possible that among the up-takers, demand and motivation for credit overshadowed pricing 
conditions. (Table 2). We later conducted a sensitivity analysis where we repeated the model 
with baseline controls but dropping the subsidy groups. We see consistent result on the 
treatment effect on uptake where RCC without subsidies increased uptake likelihood by 
6.6%~7% and is still significant at 10%. Annex:1 
 As mentioned, we found these results puzzling. The point of the sub-experiment, albeit 
smaller than the whole with only 39 subsidy offers for each of three subsidy levels (N=117), 
was to obtain some insight into the elasticity of the risk premium when linked to credit. These 
results suggest that not only is the demand for insurance-linked credit highly inelastic, but that 
the added value of linking insurance to credit may not be as strong as we had originally thought. 
Subsequent work, as yet unpublished, employed a Choice Experiment on a random sample of 
the original subjects. Those results suggest that the demand is not as inelastic as this sub-
experiment implies. Nevertheless, these results remind us that the enthusiasm that often 
accompanies results from theory ought to be dampened when that theory is put to practice. 
 
                              Table 2: The effect of treatment on credit uptake 
  Probit coefficients   Margins 
With baseline controls No Yes   No Yes 




RCC - no subsidy 0.126 0.191*  0.046 0.068* 
 (0.10) (0.10) 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
25% subsidy - RCC 0.168 0.213  0.061 0.076 
 (0.21) (0.21) 
 (0.08) (0.08) 
50% subsidy - RCC 0.129 0.282  0.047 0.103 
 (0.22) (0.24) 
 (0.08) (0.09) 
75% subsidy - RCC -0.226 -0.261  -0.074 -0.082 
 (0.23) (0.24) 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
Constant -0.511*** -1.708***   
 
  -(0.07) -(0.64)       
 
4.3 Effect of credit rationing on up-take 
As already reported in section 4.1, credit up-take was similar among unconstrained and quantity 
rationed households, both at 35%, while the uptake among the risk rationed was 29%. To 
statistically examine the effect of credit rationing on uptake, we estimated a binary Probit 
model with uptake on the left hand and rationing on the right. Unconstrained was the omitted 
base category for the rationing groups. We find that quantity rationing has a positive effect on 
uptake although this is neither substantial (negligible marginal effect) nor statistically 
significant. However, the positive sign implies that farmers who are quantity rationed are 
potentially more likely to take credit if offered compared to their unconstrained counterparts. 
This was in line with our priori expectation and the existing theory that quantity constrained 
farmers have positive notional demand for credit, but they receive less or zero supply. Offered 
a credit facility, as was done with this RCT, this group of farmers will eventually have effective 
demand. 
As expected, risk rationing has a negative effect on uptake, and this was statistically 
significant at 10%. This implies that risk rationed farmers were less likely to take the offered 
credit compared to their unconstrained colleagues. From the marginal effect column, being risk 
rationed reduced the probability of uptake by 6.3%. This again is in line with existing theory 
that even when provided with an income enhancing credit contract, a risk rationed farmer 
chooses to withdraw from the credit market and instead undertakes a less return but more 
certain/less risky venture. This is due to the fear of the risk of losing collateral or undergoing 
other defaulting implications.  (Table 3)  
RCC was designed to solve this pre-existing risk rationing condition. However, this 
may not have been achieved with this first implementation phase since the implementing lender 
required collateral in line with any traditional loan offered by the bank. This will be explored 
further in subsequent research, but it is worth noting at this point that although risk-rationed 
farmers accepted traditional credit at a lower rate than RCC, they did nonetheless accept 
traditional credit. The essential argument in Boucher et al (2009) is that while farmers may 
have a demand for credit they do not, or cannot, act upon it, resulting in distortions in the rural 
credit system. Verteramo-Chiu et al (2014) support this view. In our RCT we use the same 
direct elicitation and identification approach used in these studies so the relatively high uptake 
of traditional credit by the risk-rationed group comes as some surprise. One possible 
explanation is a finding in Verteramo-Chiu et al (2014) that the credit demand elasticity of risk-
rationed farmers increases as interest rates fall. The base interest rate of 14% actually applied 
to traditional loans in this RCT may have breached the high inelasticity that comes with higher 
interest rates on informal loans and rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCA) in the 
Machakos region which had interest rates as high as 100% according to farmers in focus 
groups. The relatively low interest rate of 14% could therefore encourage even risk-rationed 
farmers to borrow. A promising avenue to pursue is an exploration of risk-rationing in the 
presence of binding liquidity constraints. A starting point might be the proposition that for 
some risk-rationed farmers, the shadow price of binding liquidity constraints is so high, that 
the utility gain from relaxing those constraints exceeds the disutility that comes from a natural 
aversion to borrowing. 
                             Table 3: Effect of risk rationing on credit uptake 
UP_TAKE  Coef.  p-value Marginal effect p-value 
Unconstrained 0.000 .    
Quantity rationed 0.001 0.995 0.0004 0.995 
 (0.15)  (0.06)  
Risk rationed -0.176* 0.072 -0.0627* 0.070 
 (0.10)  (0.03)  
Constant -0.38*** 0.000   
 (0.07)    
Mean dependent var 0.326 SD dependent var  0.469 
Pseudo r-squared  0.003 Observations 815 
Chi-square   3.539 Prob > chi2  0.17 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Standard errors are in parenthesis 
 
4.4 The drivers of uptake 
In this section, we present the drivers of uptake from the Probit multivariate estimation 
described in section 4.2 above. Later, we dropped credit rationing and repeated the model to 
eliminate endogeneity that may arise since the same household characteristics may influence 
both rationing and uptake. The results from both models were however consistent. To avoid 
falling into the dummy-trap problem, we omitted the first categories for both treatment and 
rationing groups; namely traditional credit and unconstrained respectively. 
The direction of the relationship between the rationing groups and uptake still holds as 
explained earlier but this time, after including household characteristics covariates, even risk 
rationing is not statistically significant. Compared to unconstrained households, quantity 
rationed households were 4.5% more likely to take the credit offered while risk rationed 
households were 4% less likely to take. 
Training attendance increased uptake probability by 19% and was significant at 1%. A 
household was 7.4% more likely to take up the credit if the household head's main occupation 
was crop production.  This was significant at 5%. In the estimation excluding rationing, uptake 
probability increased by 3% with a Ksh. 1000 (USD 100) increase in weekly food consumption. 
Land ownership was negatively correlated to uptake where increment in own land size by one 
acre reduced uptake probability by 0.5% when rationing was included, and 0.4% when 
rationing was excluded from the estimation. Additionally, an increase of hired farm labour by 
1% increased uptake likelihood by 0.1% and this was significant at 10%. Revenue from 
livestock had a positive effect on uptake. An increment of annual revenue from animals by Ksh 
1000 increased uptake likelihood by 0.04%. This may not be substantial but was significant at 
5%. (Table 4) 
 
Table 4: Drivers of credit uptake for all categories combined 
  
Uptake model with 






model Margins   
Probit 
model Margins 
Unconstrained                   
Quantity rationed 0.123 0.045                 
 (0.16) (0.06)                 
Risk rationed -0.059 -0.021                 
 (0.11) (0.04)                 
Traditional credit      
RCC - no subsidy 0.191* 0.068*  0.182* 0.065*   
 (0.10) (0.04)  (0.10) (0.04) 
25% subsidy - RCC 0.213 0.076  0.197 0.071 
 (0.21) (0.08)  (0.21) (0.08) 
50% subsidy - RCC 0.282 0.103  0.267 0.097 
 (0.24) (0.09)  (0.24) (0.09) 
75% subsidy - RCC -0.261 -0.082  -0.265 -0.083 
 (0.24) (0.07)  (0.24) (0.07) 
Attended initial training and lotteries 0.531*** 0.190***  0.539*** 0.193*** 
 (0.11) (0.04)  (0.11) (0.04) 
Crop production is household head’s main activity 0.207** 0.074**  0.206** 0.074**  
 (0.11) (0.04)  (0.10) (0.04) 
Household head education level 0.006 0.002  0.007 0.003 
 (0.02) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.01) 
Male household head 0.128 0.046  0.137 0.049 
 (0.13) (0.05)  (0.13) (0.05) 
Age of household head -0.001 0.000  -0.001 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
Dependency ratio -0.001 0.000  -0.001 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
Household dietary diversification index 0.006 0.002  0.002 0.001 
 (0.05) (0.02)  (0.05) (0.02) 
Weekly expenditure on food (Ksh “000”) 0.068 0.024  0.073* 0.026*   
 (0.04) (0.02)  (0.04) (0.02) 
Land owned by household -0.013* -0.005*  -0.013* -0.004*   
 (0.01) (0.00)  (0.01) (0.00) 
Area under maize (acre) 0.007 0.002  0.006 0.002 
 (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
Annual maize production (kg) 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
Percent of hired labour 0.003* 0.001*  0.003* 0.001*   
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
Total revenue from animals 0.001** 0.004**  0.001** 0.004**  
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
Social groups/network index 0.038 0.014  0.041 0.015 
 (0.05) (0.02)  (0.05) (0.02) 
Extension services access index 0.038 0.014  0.041* 0.015*   
 (0.02) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.01) 
Subjective economic welfare 0.043 0.015  0.036 0.013 
 (0.08) (0.03)  (0.08) (0.03) 
Household went a whole day without food -0.155 -0.056  -0.147 -0.053 
 (0.17) (0.06)  (0.17) (0.06) 
Constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) score 0.045 0.016  0.054 0.019 
 (0.21) (0.08)  (0.21) (0.08) 
Constant -1.708***   -1.685***               
  (0.64)     (0.62)               
Observations 793 793  797 797 
Log likelihood -473.228   -475.63               
AIC 996.455     997.26   
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01      
 
4.5 Drivers of credit rationing  
To determine the factors that drive credit rationing among the households, we used multinomial 
Logit and multinomial Probit models with rationing as the output variable and household 
characteristics as the predictor variables. The price rationed or unconstrained group was the 
base category and therefore we interpret our results in reference to it. We find consistent results 
from both estimators with small differences in estimated coefficients. Since the coefficients are 
from non-linear models and marginal effects are not included in the table, we only interpret the 
nature and significance of the relationships but not the magnitude.  
Uptake difference between the unconstrained and the quantity rationed was 
significantly affected by only 4 out of 16 factors, two positively and two negatively correlated. 
Quantity rationing increased with dependency ratio and weekly food expenditure while the 
same reduced with household dietary diversification index and subjective welfare. This implies 
that households with more dependants than works and those who spend most of their income 
on food were more likely to be denied credit or get less than demanded.  We reason that, as the 
number of dependants in a household increases while holding income constant, the proportion 
of income that goes to food increases. This leaves the household with less surplus funds which 
can be put into loan repayment and hence their demand for credit, at best, is likely to be met 
with less supply, or at worst, be turned down. The situation is likely to get worse if dependency 
increment and income reduction occur simultaneously, which is not foreign to rural households 
especially with death of heads, spouses and/or other working household members. Dietary 
diversification and subjective economic welfare are both indices of wellbeing of a household 
and as expected, as a household’s wellbeing improves, the chances of their credit demand being 
met also increases. These findings also confirm that in the appraisal process, banks collect 
information related to households’ size, income and welfare indicators and consider them when 
making credit-worthiness verdicts.  
On the other hand, risk rationing was significantly affected by 10 out of 16 factors 
selected in the model. The households whose heads were into agriculture as their main 
occupation, either crop production or livestock rearing were less likely to be risk rationed, 
which implies that they were more likely to apply for credit. In rural areas, farming is the main 
source of income. Those not into farming as their main occupation are mostly into low income 
casual jobs and therefore have no income generating ventures to apply credit against and for. 
A few are into other businesses which still rely on the welfare of the farming households. Risk 
rationing also reduced with household head’s level of education but increased with his/her age. 
This indicates that households with younger and more educated heads were less likely to be 
risk rationed and hence would have an effective demand for credit. Risk rationing increased 
with dependency ratio, suggesting that households with more dependents than workers were 
more likely to be risk rationed than households with fewer dependants. Risk rationing also 
reduced with dietary diversification index and expenditure on food. This insinuates that 
households who spent more on food and whose consumed more diversified foods were less 
likely to be risk rationed. This is unlike quantity rationing which increased with food 
expenditure meaning that households spending more of their income on food do apply for credit 
more than those who spend less, but they are more likely to be denied credit more than those 
who spend less on food. Further, risk rationing reduced with land ownership, hired farm labour 
and household’s representation and participation in social groups and/or other social networks 






Table 5: Factors of credit rationing - multinomial Logit and Probit with unconstrained as the 
base category 
  Quantity rationed   Risk rationed 
  Logit Probit   Logit Probit 
Crop production is household head 
main activity 
-0.219 -0.169  -0.328** -0.272**  
(0.23) (0.16)  (0.15) (0.13) 
Livestock rearing is household head 
main activity 
-0.148 -0.206  -1.273** -1.031**  
(0.63) (0.46)  (0.55) (0.43) 
Household head education level -0.025 -0.024  -0.050** -0.042**  
 (0.03) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) 
Male household head 0.385 0.221  -0.197 -0.163 
 (0.30) (0.20)  (0.18) (0.15) 
Age of household head 0.006 0.004  0.011** 0.010**  
 (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
Dependency ratio  0.002* 0.002*    0.002** 0.001**  
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
Household dietary diversification 
index 
-0.299*** -0.226***  -0.205*** -0.171*** 
(0.11) (0.08)  (0.08) (0.06) 
Weekly expenditure on food 0.135* 0.087  -0.141** -0.116**  
 (0.08) (0.06)  (0.06) (0.05) 
Land owned by household -0.003 -0.006  -0.056*** -0.044*** 
 (0.01) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.02) 
Percent of hired labour -0.003 -0.002  -0.003* -0.003*   
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
Tropical livestock unit (TLU) -0.049 -0.034  0.000 0.000 
 (0.04) (0.02)  (0.00) (0.00) 
Social groups/network index 0.059 0.019  -0.179** -0.150**  
 (0.11) (0.08)  (0.07) (0.06) 
Extension services access index -0.067 -0.048  -0.023 -0.02 
 (0.05) (0.03)  (0.03) (0.03) 
Subjective economic welfare -0.328* -0.222*    -0.175 -0.148 
 (0.18) (0.12)  (0.11) (0.09) 
Household went a whole day without 
food 
0.092 0.069  -0.186 -0.152 
(0.24) (0.19)  (0.22) (0.18) 
Constant relative risk aversion 
(CRRA) score 
-0.363 -0.282  -0.161 -0.145 
(0.45) (0.31)  (0.29) (0.24) 
constant 2.064* 1.731**   3.679*** 3.063*** 







Weather related risks, particularly drought, is among the major hurdles facing smallholder 
farmers in Kenya. This is further compounded by capital constrictions, credit inaccessibility 
and existing credit rationing and risk rationing conditions. There has been much work done 
towards developing and promoting technologies and practices to help farmers cope with 
drought, but inadequate capital and lack of weather risk hedging make it hard for small holders 
to adopt them. To manage drought risk and to improve access to credit, we developed a market-
based solution that bundles rainfall index insurance and agricultural credit and implemented a 
randomized controlled trial with 1170 households. We assess farmers’ credit rationing, its 
determinants and effects on credit uptake. We also assess the effects of bundling weather index 
insurance on credit uptake as well as the determinants of credit uptake, including the influence 
of farm level characteristics.  
We find that 48% of the households were price-rationed/unconstrained, 41% were risk-
rationed and 11% were quantity-rationed. With reference to price-rationed or unconstrained 
households, quantity rationing probability increased with dependency ratio and weekly food 
expenditure while the same reduced with household dietary diversification index and subjective 
welfare. Risk rationing probability on the other hand increased with age of the household head 
and dependency ratio and reduced with crop production and livestock rearing being the 
household head’s main occupation, household head’s education level, dietary diversification 
index, weekly expenditure on food, land ownership and hired labour.  
The average credit uptake rate was 33% with the uptake of bundled credit being 
significantly higher than that of traditional credit. Premium subsidies did not affect uptake 
significantly insinuating that the need for credit among those who decided to take was high and 
the price differences in credit and insurance did not affect their decision. Risk rationing seems 
to influence the credit uptake negatively.  RCC was designed to particularly deal with risk 
rationing where farmers fail to take credit due to fear of losing their asset or hampering 
consumption to pay for credit in case their investment fails to yield due to drought. Other non-
random socio-economic factors which were significantly associated with uptake are, training 
attendance, crop production being the main household head occupation, expenditure on food, 
hired labour, livestock revenue and access to credit which had a positive correlation to credit 
uptake and land ownership which was negatively correlated to uptake.   
While these results provide very important insights into credit behaviour and demand 
of subsistence farmers, our study came with some surprises. The first is our finding that farmers 
self-identified as being risk-rationed accepted traditional credit at a lower, but only slightly so, 
rate than RCC. Risk-rationing was a key driver of the RCT with the premise being that RCC 
would be substantially more attractive than traditional credit. Our reliance on risk-rationing as 
a motive might have been over-stated. Our sub-experiment which provided insurance subsidy 
to 117 farm households had a near-insignificant effect suggesting that the demand for the 
insurance component of RCC is highly inelastic. We have suggested that the opportunity costs 
of binding liquidity constraints may have been so high that the costs of traditional or risk-
contingent credit were low in comparison, and that this liquidity effect might dominate the risk-
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Annex 1: Treatment effect on credit uptake - Sensitivity check by dropping subsidies  
  
Uptake model with 






model Margins   
Probit 
model Margins 
Unconstrained                   
Quantity rationed 0.067 0.024                 
 (0.17) (0.06)                 
Risk rationed -0.005 -0.002                 
 (0.11) (0.04)                 
Normal credit      
RCC - no subsidy 0.185* 0.066*  0.177* 0.063*   
 (0.10) (0.04)  (0.10) (0.04) 
If attended the initial training and lot 0.481*** 0.172***  0.490*** 0.175*** 
 (0.12) (0.04)  (0.12) (0.04) 
Crop production is household head main activity 0.218* 0.078*  0.214* 0.077*   
 (0.11) (0.04)  (0.11) (0.04) 
Household head education level 0.013 0.004  0.013 0.005 
 (0.02) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.01) 
Male household head 0.098 0.035  0.105 0.037 
 (0.15) (0.05)  (0.15) (0.05) 
Age of household head 0.001 0.000  0.001 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
Dependency ratio -0.001 0.000  -0.001* -0.000*   
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
Household dietary index 0.023 0.008  0.019 0.007 
 (0.06) (0.02)  (0.06) (0.02) 
Weekly expenditure on food 0.066 0.024  0.067 0.024 
 (0.05) (0.02)  (0.05) (0.02) 
Land owned by household -0.020* -0.007*  -0.02 -0.007 
 (0.01) (0.00)  (0.01) (0.00) 
Area under maize (acre) 0.006 0.002  0.004 0.001 
 (0.02) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.01) 
Annual maize production (kg) 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
Percent of hired labour 0.002 0.001  0.002 0.001 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
Total revenue from animals 0.001* 0.000*  0.001* 0.000*   
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
Social groups/network index 0.047 0.017  0.049 0.018 
 (0.06) (0.02)  (0.06) (0.02) 
Extension services access index 0.050** 0.018**  0.053** 0.019**  
 (0.03) (0.01)  (0.03) (0.01) 
Subjective economic welfare 0.108 0.039  0.105 0.038 
 (0.09) (0.03)  (0.09) (0.03) 
Household went a whole day without food -0.107 -0.038  -0.103 -0.037 
 (0.17) (0.06)  (0.17) (0.06) 
CRRA score -0.007 -0.003  0.003 0.001 
 (0.23) (0.08)  (0.23) (0.08) 
constant 
-
2.118***   
-
2.074***               
  (0.71)     (0.68)               
Observations 677 677  680 680 
Log likelihood -402.883   -404.434               
AIC 849.766     848.867   
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01      
 
